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Abstract
The basic insight of the literature concerning the Median Voter The-
orem and its applications, dating back to Black (1948), is that the poli-
cies implemented by di¤erent parties once in o¢ce should approach the
median voter’s preferred policy if they run in a single-dimensional and
democratic electoral space. This strong prediction has been challenged in
recent years using arguments related to the observation that usually the
political spaces concern much more than one single dimension and that,
once we consider such a space, the Median Voter Theorem cannot be ap-
plied. Our idea is that one can challenge the median voter predictions
even if we keep considering just one single dimension. Infect also in elec-
toral competitions characterized by a very important issue seen by voters
as “salient” is almost impossible to observe in reality the convergence pre-
dicted by the Black’s theorem. In the present model we introduce a simple
assumption over the process of opinions’ formation of the voters and we
show as in equilibrium strategic considerations lead the parties to choose
polarized platforms.
1 Introduction
In recent years there is an increasing agreement of the way one should approach
the analysis of public policies. As Drazen (2000) pointed policy choices are not
made by an hypothetical benevolent social planner, but by purposeful political
agents participating in a well de…ned decision making process. The natural way
to deal with such a situation is to combine economic theory with the analysis
of alternative collective choice procedures.
This literature has particularly focused on the so called median-voter equi-
libria which apply to policy issues where disagreement between voters is likely
to be one dimensional. In this kind of set up a political equilibrium selects
the policy preferred by the voter with median preferences that turns out to be
always the Condorcet winner, i.e. a policy that cannot be beaten by any other
policy in a pairwise majority vote (see Downs (1957)).
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One of the basic predictions of such an analysis is that the parties that
run for an o¢ce will always announce platforms very similar among them and
approaching the one preferred by the median voter. Therefore one should not
observe slight di¤erences in actually implemented policy depending on what
party wins the electoral competition.
One can challenge this strong prediction having a look on the outcomes
of electoral competitions in the modern democracies. It is almost impossible
to observe right and left parties proposing the same platform and usually the
implemented …scal policies are quite di¤erent depending on what coalition get
the o¢ce. The recent US election are an illuminating example: on the one hand
G.W. Bush jr. proposed tax cutting and welfare reduction while A. Gore’s
platform focused on the defense of the actual budget surplus and the improving
of the publicly …nanced health care. But there are a huge amount of concordant
examples coming out also from European reality: one can think to the social
security reform that Mr. Berlusconi wanted to apply in Italy in 1994 and to
the reform implemented by Mr. Prodi in 19961 (the …rst proposed an almost
immediately shift towards full-funded system while the second proposal was
based on a 30 years transition and a mix between PAYG and full-funding).
On a theoretical ground these failures of median-voter predictions have been
explained using arguments related to the observation that usually the political
space concerns much more than one single dimension and that, once we consider
such a space, the Black’s theorem cannot be applied.
Our idea is that one can challenge the median voter approach even if we
keep considering just one single dimension. Infect also in electoral competitions
characterized by a very important issue seen by voters as “salient” (see Besley
and Burgess (2000) for a discussion) is almost impossible to observe in reality
the convergence predicted by the Downs theorem. Moreover, in our opinion, it
is misleading to model the political competition as a “crazy” run of the parties
towards the electors’ positions; one should take into account the potential rule
of the parties as opinion-makers.
In particular, in the present paper we develop a model of electoral com-
petition over redistributive policies which presents very di¤erent insights with
respect to the ones that are provided by the traditional median voter approach
and in which the parties play an active rule in in‡uencing the voters’ opinions.
This assumption leads to a sort of polarization of the parties positions and we
…rmly believe that this attitude of the parties is one of the characterizing fea-
tures of modern democracies. We infect share the idea of Kalai-Kalai (1999)
who point that in public debates, shared living accommodations, and many
other types of interaction participants behavior is seen to polarize: even moder-
ate individuals with similar preferences often take extreme, opposing positions
in these settings.
In the second part of the present article we will present the model of electoral
competition over redistributive policies that we employed. This model is based
1 For a detailed description of Mr. Prodi’s reform of the social security system see “Gov-
ernare l’Italia” (Il Mulino, 1996).
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on a very common economic set-up and takes into account partizan parties (that
is, following the de…nition provided by Persson-Tabellini (1999), each candidate
is solely motivated by his utility function); moreover we take into account the
fact that voters could be in‡uenced by the parties’ political campaign. We
will show how an equilibrium which the policies announced by the two parties
are very di¤erent is found and we study some particular cases. Then we will
examine the role that the “in‡uentiability” of voters plays in the determination
of the equilibrium policy. Finally, we will conclude with some suggestions for
further research.
2 The Model
The model we develop is based on the benchmark provided by Meltzer-Richard
(1981) . There is a continuum of individuals who di¤er in productivity, and
therefore in earned income, and they choose their preferred combination of con-
sumption and leisure. Not all the individuals work, but those who do pay a
portion of their income in taxes. The choice between labor and leisure, and the
amount of earned income and taxes, depend on the tax rate and on the size of
transfer payments.
Now, our aim is to provide a positive description of the reality so we assume
that the tax rate and the amount of income redistributed depend on the voting
rule and the distribution of income. Moreover, as we will see in the following
sections, we take into account partizan-candidate with their own utility function
and we assume that voters are partially in‡uentiable by the candidates’ plat-
forms. These simply assumptions will lead to equilibrium results quite di¤erent
to the standard results obtained in unidimensional political space (see Hotelling
(1929) and Downs (1957)).
2.1 Economic Environment
The economy we consider has relatively standard features. There are a large
number of individuals. Each treats prices, wages and tax rates as given, de-
termined in the markets for goods and labor and by the political process re-
spectively. Di¤erences in the choice of labor, leisure, and consumption and
di¤erences in wages arises solely because of di¤erences in endowments which
re‡ect di¤erences in productivity.
In this section we highlight the process trough which individuals choose the
level of consumption and leisure taking as given the policies decisions on taxes
and transfers.
The utility function of each agent is,
ui(ci; li) (1)
We assume this function to be strictly concave in c and l. Consumption
and leisure are normal goods and there is no capital and no uncertainty in the
economy.
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As we said we consider a framework characterized by heterogenous agents.
The heterogeneity is given by the productivity xi of each one of them, so that
the pre-tax income of each individual is:
yi(xi) = xi ¢ ni(xi) (2)
Income is measured in units of consumption.
Tax revenues …nance lump-sum redistribution of r units of consumption per
capita. We consider proportional taxes which are levied on earned income so
that the fraction of income paid in taxes net of transfers rises with income. The
budget constraint that each individual faces is,
ci(xi) = (1 ¡ t) ¢ xi ¢ ni(xi) + r (3)
where t is the proportional tax rate.
We can now state the maximization problem solved by the consumers.
Max
ci;li
ui(ci; li)
subject to the following two constraints
ci(xi) = (1 ¡ t) ¢ xi ¢ ni(xi) + r
li = 1 ¡ ni
The latter constraint obviously states that the agents divide their time be-
tween labor and leisure.
We can restate this problem as follows
Max
ni2[0;1]
u [(1 ¡ t) ¢ xi ¢ ni(xi) + r; 1 ¡ ni]
the FOC for this problem is:
@u
@ni
= 0 ) uc ¢ (1 ¡ t) ¢ xi ¡ ul = 0 (4)
The (4) determines the optimal labor choice ni [r; (1 ¡ t) ¢ xi] . The choice
turns out to depend only on the after tax wage, (1 ¡ t) ¢ xi, and on welfare
payments r.
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2.2 Political Preferences
To …nd the equilibrium in this economy we have now to characterize how taxes
and transfers are chosen.
First of all let us assume that in each moment in time the Government
budget is balanced and that all government spending is for redistribution. If
per-capita income is y, then
t ¢ y = r (5)
Letting F(¢) represent the distribution function for individual productivity,
per-capita productivity is obtained in the following way,
y =
Z 1
0
x ¢ n [r; (1 ¡ t) ¢ x]dF (x) (6)
Using equations (1), (4) and (5) we are now able to write down the indirect
utility function for the consumer with respect to the tax rate,
ui(t) = ui [t ¢ y + yi ¢ (1 ¡ t); 1 ¡ ni] (7)
If the individuals were perfectly rational to evaluate their preferred tax rate
we should maximize this indirect utility with respect to t. The FOC for this
problem is
@ui(t)
@t
= 0 )
µ
y +
@y
@t
¢ t ¡ yi
¶
¢ uc = 0
) ti = (yi ¡ y)
@y=@t
(8)
Since the derivative of per-capita income with respect to taxes is always
negative (because of the distortionary e¤ects of taxation) equation (8) states
that individuals with average income lower than the mean income would prefer
a positive tax rate while individuals richer than the mean would prefer a negative
tax rate. Note that once t is chosen r is automatically determined.
This would be the choice of each individual if his choice were totally inde-
pendent on the platforms proposed by the parties. But, In the spirit of Kalai
and Kalai (1999), we assume that the individuals are partially in‡uenced by the
platforms that candidates present during their campaign. Formally we assume
that the preferred tax rate of each individual is an average weight between the
rationally chosen tax rate (derived by the (8)) and the arithmetic average of the
platforms proposed
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t¤i = ® ¢
(yi ¡ y)
@y=@t
+ (1 ¡ ®) ¢ tR + tL
2
(9)
where tR, tL represents the tax rates proposed by the parties and at which
the parties are fully committed after the election (i.e. the platforms).
How will be select the tax rate, and so the transfers, by the society as a
whole?
We assume that individuals vote to choose the implemented tax rate by
universal su¤rage with majority rule and since in our framework the condition
to apply the median voter theorem are veri…ed, i.e. unidimensional choice and
single peaked preferences2 , the implemented tax rate will be the one preferred
by the median voter.
By equation (8) we easily get what would be the tax rate preferred by a
perfectly rational median,
µ
y +
@y
@t
¢ t ¡ ym
¶
¢ uc = 0
) tm = (ym ¡ y)
@y=@t
But, in the light of our assumption about the in‡uentiability of voters, the
actually preferred tax by the median is
t¤m = ® ¢
(ym ¡ y)
@y=@t
+ (1 ¡ ®) ¢ tR + tL
2
(10)
2.3 Equilibrium Policy
To …nd what policy, i.e. what tax rate, will be chosen in equilibrium we have
now to specify what will be the parties behavior during the campaign. In what
follows we are going to assume that parties are fully committed to the platforms
they announce during the campaign. Moreover, we consider partizan parties,
that is parties that do not derive utility simply from the o¢ce they get. In
particular, let us assume that the two competing parties have linear utilities
and that they would like the median voter’s opinion to be close to their opinion
UR(t
¤
m) = ¡jt¤R ¡ t¤mj
2 First of all note that the only decision over which the individuals have to vote are the
tax rate t (infect r is obtained automatically given the tax rate and the government budget
constraint) so the political space is uni-dimensional. Moreover, the individuals indirect utility
function (7) re‡ects single-peaked preferences over the tax rate (see Roberts (1977) for a
discussion of this result).
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UL(t
¤
m) = ¡jt¤L ¡ t¤mj
where t¤R and t
¤
L are the preferred policies of the two parties. These utility
functions have two interesting and realistic features: (i) the parties do care
about their distance with respect to the median voter, so they are incentivated
to attract voters and win the election, and (ii) they have an own preference
on the policies, so they want to win the election to implement a policy not to
di¤erent from their favorite one and not just to be in o¢ce.
Now we have all the elements to examine the political competition in our
model. Infect this competition is represented by a simultaneous move game be-
tween the two parties in which the strategy of each player consists in announcing
a platform. After this announcements the individuals vote and then the winner
party implement its announced policy. It is important to remember at this stage
that the winning party will be the one who announce a policy nearer to the one
preferred by the median voter.
In what follows we are going to evaluate what will be the equilibrium of such
a political game in two distinct cases: t¤R < t
¤
L < t
¤
m and t
¤
L > t
¤
R > t
¤
m. The
mechanism is the same also for situations in which the two ideal points of the
party are located at di¤erent side with respect to the median ideal point but
the two cases we present here are more illuminating to our end.
2.3.1 Case 1
Let us assume that t¤R < t¤L < t¤m. What will be the Nash Equilibrium of the
simultaneous move game played by the two parties in this case?
The strategy adopted in equilibrium by the Right party (R), that is the
platform to which it commits, is tR = 0, while the Left party (L) will choose a
platform such that:
®tm + (1 ¡ ®) tL
2
= t¤R +
t¤L ¡ t¤R
2
+
"
2
) 2®tm + (1 ¡ ®)tL = 2t¤R + t¤L ¡ t¤R + "
) (1 ¡ ®)tL = t¤R + t¤L ¡ 2®tm + "
) tL = 1
(1 ¡ ®)( t
¤
R + t
¤
L ¡ 2®tm + ")
as a consequence the median voter has the following preferred tax:
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t¤m = ® ¢
(ym ¡ y)
@y=@t
+ ( t¤R + t
¤
L ¡ 2®tm + ") (11)
and therefore she will vote for the Left party since:
jt¤m ¡ tLj < jt¤m ¡ tRj
Therefore the implemented policy will be tL, because of full-commitment
assumption, that does not coincide with the median voter favorite policy.
Proof: In this con…guration, none of the players can improve the outcome
of the election relative to her own preferences. The Left party wins the election
and obtains its maximal payo¤, since if it increases the tax rate proposed in its
platform it will still win the election but its utility will be reduced while if it
reduces the tax rate proposed it will loss the election and the …nal outcome will
be t = 0. On the other hand, the Right party is already pushed to an extreme
position and it cannot go further to in‡uence the decisive voter towards its
position. Furthermore, every other con…guration is unstable because one of the
parties will be able to unilaterally change her platform to move the median voter
towards its position thereby increasing its payo¤..
Note that in equilibrium the platforms of the two parties do not coincide
in contrast with the traditional results of the median voter literature and, for
values of ® su¢ciently low could be even more distant between them than their
original positions. Moreover the actually implemented policy is di¤erent from
the median voter’s preferred policy. We call this result a “polarized outcome”.
Remark: There is a caveat to the strong prediction that we have just stated.
The result is true only when the following disequality is satis…ed
t¤L + t
¤
R
2
> ®tm
That is for small values of ® or for parties’ ideal positions near to the one
of the median voter.
2.3.2 Case 2
Let us now assume that t¤L > t
¤
R > t
¤
m.
In this case the party that has a natural advantage is the Right one (infect
its position is nearer to the one of the median). In equilibrium the Left party
will announce tL = 1, while the Right party will choose a platform such that:
®tm + (1 ¡ ®) tR + 1
2
= t¤L ¡
t¤L ¡ t¤R
2
¡ "
2
) 2®tm + (1 ¡ ®)tR + 1 ¡ ® = 2t¤L + t¤L ¡ t¤R ¡ "
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) (1 ¡ ®)tR = t¤R + t¤L ¡ 1 + ® ¡ 2®tm ¡ "
) tR = 1
(1 ¡ ®)( t
¤
R + t
¤
L ¡ 1 + ® ¡ 2®tm + ")
as a consequence the median voter has the following preferred tax:
t¤m = ® ¢
(ym ¡ y)
@y=@t
+
(1 ¡ ®)
2
¢ t
¤
R + t
¤
L ¡ 1 + ® ¡ 2®tm + " + 1 ¡ ®
(1 ¡ ®)
) t¤m = ® ¢
(ym ¡ y)
@y=@t
+
t¤R + t¤L ¡ 2®tm + "
2
(12)
and therefore she will vote for the Right party since:
jt¤m ¡ tRj < jt¤m ¡ tLj
Proof: same reasoning of case 1.
3 The rule of “In‡uentiability”
So far we developed the general case of our political competition model consid-
ering what we have de…ned “partially in‡uentiable median voter”. This in‡u-
entiability is characterized by the parameter ® which tell us how important is
for the voters their economic position (i.e. the rational choice) and how it is the
ideology (i.e. the choice linked to the parties’ claims about the society welfare).
To better understand the role that this parameter plays in the model and to
gain an intuition on the parties’ behavior let us consider to very special case
® = 0.
In this case the rational component plays no rule in determining the median
voter position so the Nash Equilibrium of the game will be totally independent
with respect to the economic framework (heterogeneity does not matter). In
particular what we get in this case is:
t¤m =
tR + tL
2
Take now for example in case 1 (the same reasoning is true for case 2). We
have now that t¤R < t
¤
L < t
¤
m and, in equilibrium, it will be tR = 0 and the Left
party wins election proposing,
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tL = ( t
¤
R + t
¤
L + ")
It is now easy to give an intuition to “illuminate” this kind of result. If
the Right party moves to 0 this means that it is changing the median position
exactly t¤R steps so the same, plus a little ", but in the opposite direction has to
do its opponent to win. Now, the Right party cannot push more on its side the
median voter so the Left party is the winner. As in the general case, every other
point do not represent equilibria since one of the to party (the most distant from
the median) can in‡uence the median and increase its payo¤.
4 Conclusion
How government spending and taxes are set is an open question for both economists
and political scientists. Recent developments have led to a vision which points
on the consideration that public policy must strike a balance between the con-
‡icting interests of di¤erent voters. The con‡ict largely re‡ects socio-economic
factors, deriving from di¤erences in income, age, employment status or geo-
graphical residence. In the simplest setting, these factors shape the distribution
of voters’ policy preferences which, in turn, are aggregated into public policy by
the majority principle.
To model this kind of con‡ict the so called median-voter equilibria have
been largely applied by both economists and political scientists. Such equilibria
basically constitute the solution to an optimal taxation problem, given a very
special social welfare function, where only the utility of median individual carries
positive weight. The existence conditions for these equilibria may be stringent
but there are policy issues, such as the size of broad redistributive programs,
where it can be argued that voters disagreement tends to be aligned on a single
dimension from, say, left to right.
In the present article we join this vision about the political scenario and
about the so called “dictatorship” of the median voter but we also point on
the empirical observation that the strong prediction about the convergence of
parties platforms is absolutely disappointed in reality. How can we explain this
sort of paradox?
Our idea is that what is missing in part of the literature about the positive
analysis of redistributive policies is the emphasis on the active role that parties
play as opinion-makers. In the present article we explicitly model this rule
considering in‡uentiable voters (i.e. voters that are sensitive with respect to
the platforms proposed during the electoral campaign). The fundamental result
is that in equilibrium parties tend to polarize in order to attract the voters and
to win the election so that the implemented redistributive policy will depend on
what party will get the o¢ce and not simply on ex-ante distribution of voters.
In future we think that one should pursue this kind of analysis more fully
to analyze the e¤ects of what we de…ned polarized behavior of the parties on
other issues apart from the redistributive one; for example one could analyze
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how such a framework changes the predictions of the traditional median-voter
based models (see Alesina-Rodrik (1994)) in a dynamic framework where the
policy issue is represented by taxes on capital and labor and where the political
decisions can strongly a¤ect the long run growth performance of the economy.
We do believe that this line of research can help to better understand the func-
tioning of a modern democracy and the political strategies adopted by parties
during the electoral campaigns.
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